Coups and refugee flows in autocracies and democracies

Much research stresses the impact of armed conflict on refugee flows. This article focuses on another form of political instability that has yet to be systematically examined: coups. It presents a typology of coups by considering (a) whether coup plotters succeed or not in seizing power, and (b) the type of regime after the coup. It identifies four types of coup attempts: (1) failed coups in autocracy, (2) failed coups in democracy, (3) autocratic coups, and (4) democratic coups. We argue that failed coups in autocracies and autocratic coups increase government repression and hinder economic performance, creating societal environments that trigger refugee flows. This contrasts with more stable environments following failed coups in democracies and democratic coups that are expected not to affect refugee flows. Quantitative analysis of all countries between 1980 and 2016 supports the theory, and qualitative analysis of varieties of coup attempts in Egypt, Spain, and Turkey illustrates the postulated theoretical mechanisms.